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Abstract This paper presents the model used for simulation purposes within the
Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. REMS (a Rational Expectations
Model for the Spanish economy) is a small open economy dynamic general equilib-
rium model in the vein of the New-Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis models, with a
strongly micro-founded system of equations. In the long run REMS behaves in accor-
dance with the neoclassical growth model. In the short run, it incorporates nominal,
real and financial frictions. Real frictions include adjustment costs in consumption
(via habits in consumption and rule-of-thumb households) and investment into phys-
ical capital. Due to financial frictions, there is no perfect arbitrage between different
types of assets. The model also allows for slow adjustment in wages and price rigid-
ities, which are specified through a Calvo-type Phillips curve. All these modelling
choices are fairly in line with other existing models for the Spanish economy. One
valuable contribution of REMS to the renewed vintage of D(S)GE models attempting
to feature the Spanish economy is the specification of the labour market according to
the search paradigm, which is best suited to assess the impact of welfare policies on
both the intensive and extensive margins of employment. The model’s most valuable
asset is the rigour of the analysis of the transmission channels linking policy action
with economic outcomes.
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1 Introduction
REMS is a small open economy dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model that
attempts to feature the main characteristics of the Spanish economy. It builds upon
the existing literature on macroeconomic models.1 The model is primarily intended
to serve as a simulation tool within the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Finance, with a focus on the economic impact of alternative policy measures over
the medium term. REMS’ most valuable asset is the rigour of the analysis of the
transmission channels linking policy options with economic outcomes.
The small open economy assumption implies that a number of foreign variables are
given from the perspective of the national economy and that the magnitude of spillover
effects is small. This modelling choice seems to us a fair compromise between realism
and tractability.
REMS is in the tradition of DGE models. As such, it departs from MOISEES2 in
a number of modelling routes. Equations in the model are explicitely derived from
intertemporal optimization by representative households and firms under technologi-
cal, budgetary and institutional constraints. Thus economic decisions are solidlymicro-
founded and any ad hoc dynamics has been avoided. Unlike the traditional Keynesian
approach adopted in MOISEES, with backward-looking behaviour strongly focused
on the demand side of the economy, REMS is a New Neoclassical-Keynesian synthe-
sis model. Behaviour is predominantly forward-looking and short-term dynamics is
embedded into a neoclassical growth model that determines economic developments
over the long run. However, since markets do not generally work in a competitive
fashion, the levels of employment and economic activity will be lower than those that
would prevail in a competitive setting.
In the short run, REMS incorporates nominal, real and financial frictions. Real
frictions include adjustment costs in consumption (via the incorporation to the model
of habits in consumption and rule-of-thumb households) and investment into physical
capital. Due to financial frictions, there is no perfect arbitrage between different types
of assets. The model also allows for slow adjustment in wages and price rigidities,
which are specified through a Calvo-type Phillips curve. All these modelling choices
are fairly in line with other existing models for the Spanish economy. The main con-
tribution of REMS to this renewed vintage of D(S)GE models is the specification
1 Many central banks and international institutions have elaborated D(S)GE models. These include, inter
alia, SIGMA for the US (Erceg et al. 2006), the BEQM for the UK (Harrison et al. 2005), the TOTEM for
Canada (Murchison et al. 2004), AINO for Finland (Kilponen et al. 2004), or the models devised by Smets
and Wouters (2003) for EMU, Lindé et al. (2004) for Sweden and Cadiou et al. (2001) for 14 OECD coun-
tries. Two models of the Spanish economy different than REMS are BEMOD and MEDEA, respectively
developed by Andrés et al. (2006) and Burriel et al. (2007).
2 MOISEES (Modelo de Investigacion y Simulacion de la Economia Española) is the preceding simulation
tool available at the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. See Molinas et al. (1990).
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of the labour market according to the search paradigm. This approach has proved
successful in providing micro-foundations for equilibrium unemployment in the long
run and accounting for both the extensive and intensive margins of employment at
business-cycle frequencies. It is therefore best suited to the assessment of welfare
policies having an impact on the labour market.
Themodel is parametrized using Spanish data. To this aim, a database (REMSDB)3
has been elaborated that satisfies the model’s estimation and calibration requirements
and serves to generate a baseline scenario for REMS.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the theoretical
model. Section 3 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 4 shows the properties of
the model by analysing the basic transmission channels following standard simula-
tions. The last section presents the main conclusions.
2 Theoretical framework
We model a decentralized, small open economy where households, firms, policy-
makers and the external sector actively interact each period by trading one final good,
government bonds, two primary production factors and one intermediate input. House-
holds are the owners of the available production factors and all the firms operating
in the economy. Thus households rent physical capital and labour services out to
firms, for which they are paid interest income and wages. In the final goods sector
firms produce goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. The
intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive firms which produce
intermediate varieties employing capital, labour and energy. Job creation is costly
in terms of time and real resources. Thus a pure economic rent arises from each
job match over which the worker and the firm negotiate in an efficient-bargaining
manner.
Each period the government faces a budget constraint where overall expenditure is
financed by debt issuance and various distortionary taxes. Intertemporal sustainabil-
ity of fiscal balance is ensured by a conventional policy reaction function, whereby
a lump-sum transfer accommodates the deviation of the debt to GDP ratio from its
target level.
Monetary policy is managed by the European Central Bank (ECB) via a Taylor
rule, which allows for some smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation
and output gap.
Each household is made of working-age agents who may be active or inactive.
In turn, active workers participating in the labour market may either be employed
or unemployed. Unemployed agents are actively searching for a job. Firms’ invest-
ment in vacant posts is endogenously determined and so are job inflows. Finally, job
destruction is taken as exogenous.
3 See Boscá et al. (2007), for further details.
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2.1 Consumption behaviour
A large body of empirical literature documents substantial deviations of consumption
from the permanent-income hypothesis. To account for this evidence, we incorporate
liquidity-constrained consumers into the standard Keynesian model along the lines
of Galí et al. (2007). The household sector consists of a continuum of households
of size Nt . A number N ot of these households has unlimited access to capital mar-
kets where they can buy and sell government bonds and accumulate physical capital.
These financial transactions enable non-liquidity constrained households to smooth
consumption intertemporally in response to changes in the economic environment.
The superscript “o” stands for “optimizing consumers”. The remaining Nrt house-
holds is liquidity constrained. These households cannot trade in financial and physical
assets and consume out of their disposable income each period. The superscript “r”
stands for “rule-of-thumb (RoT ) consumers”. The size of the working-age population
is given by Nt = N ot + Nrt . Let 1 − λr and λr denote the shares of optimizing and
RoT consumers in working age population. Working-age population, optimizing and
RoT consumers all grow at the exogenous (gross) rate of γN = Nt/Nt−1, implying
that λr is constant over time.
Let At represent the trend component of total factor productivity at time t , which
will be assumed to grow at the exogenous rate of γA = At/At−1. Balanced growth in
the model can be ensured by transforming variables in a convenient way. More specif-
ically, any flow variable Xt is made stationary through xt ≡ Xt/At−1Nt−1. Similarly,
any stock variable Xt−1 is made stationary through xt−1 ≡ Xt−1/At−1Nt−1.
Following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), we assume that households pool
their income and distribute it evenly among its members. This allows households’
members to fully insure each other against fluctuations in employment.
2.1.1 Optimizing households
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t−1 and s(1− not−1) represent, consumption, the employment rate and the unem-
ployment rate of optimizing households; s is the (exogenous) share of the non-
employed workers actively searching for jobs;4 T, l1t and l2t are total endowment
of time, hours worked per employee and hours devoted to job search by the unem-
ployed. l1t is determined jointly by the firm and the worker as part of the same Nash
bargain that is used to determine wages (see Sect. 2.4). l2t is assumed to be a function
of the overall economic activity, so that individual households take it as given.5
There are a number of preference parameters defining the utility function of opti-
mizing households. Future utility is discounted at a rate of β ∈ (0, 1). The parameter η
defines the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, which is equal to 1
η
. ho > 0 indicates that
consumption is subject to habits. The subjective value imputed to leisure by workers
may vary across employment statuses, and thus φ1 = φ2 in general.
For simplicity, we adopt the money-in-the-utility function approach to incorporate
money into the model. The timing implicit in this specification assumes that this var-
iable is the household’s real money holdings at the end of the period (mot = M
o
t
Pt At N ot
where Pt is the aggregate price level), thus after having purchased consumption goods,
that yields utility.6
The maximization of (1) is constrained as follows. The budget constraint (2)
describes the various sources and uses of income. The term wt (1 − τ l)not−1l1t
4 For simplicity, we assume that the leisure utility of the unemployed searching for a job is the same as for
the non-active:
s(1 − not−1)φ2
(T − l2t )1−η
1 − η = (1 − s)(1 − n
o
t−1)φ3
(T − l3t )1−η
1 − η .
5 More specifically, we assume that the search effort undertaken by unemployed workers increases during










where φe is the elasticity of search effort with respect to the rate of growth of GDP and ρe captures the
strength of inertia in the search effort. The reason for endogeneizing search effort in this way is an empirical
one, making possible to obtain a reasonable volatility of vacancies.
6 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) have criticized this timing assumption on the grounds that the appropriate
way to model the utility from money is to assume that money balances available before going to purchase
goods yield utility. However, we follow the standard approach in the literature whereby the end-of-period
money holdings yield utility.
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captures net labour income earned by the fraction of employed workers, where wt
stands for hourly real wages. The product rrwt (1−τ l)s(1−not−1)l2t measures unem-
ployment benefits accruing to the unemployed, where rr denotes the replacement rate
of the unemployment subsidy to the market wage. Ricardian households hold four
kinds of assets, namely private physical capital (kot ), domestic and euro-zone bonds
(bot and b
o,emu
t ) and money balances (M
o
t ). Barring money, the remaining assets yield
some remuneration. As reflected in rt kot−1(1− τ k)+ τ kδkot−1, optimizing households
pay capital income taxes less depreciation allowances after their earnings on physi-
cal capital. Interest payments on domestic and foreign debt are respectively captured
by rnt−1
bot−1




1+πct , where r
n and remu represent the nominal interest rates
on domestic and EMU bonds, which differ because of a risk premium (see further
below). The remaining two sources of revenues are lump-sum transfers, trht , and
other government transfers, gst .
The household’s consumption is given by (1+ τ c) PctPt cot , where τ c is the consump-
tion income tax. Investment into physical capital, which is affected by increasing




j ot (1 + φ2 ( jtkt−1 )). Note that the pres-
ence in the model of the relative prices Pct /Pt and P
i
t /Pt implies that a distinction is
made between the three deflators of consumption, investment and aggregate output.
The remaining constraints faced by Ricardian households concern the laws of
motion for capital and employment. Each period the private capital stock kot depreci-
ates at the exogenous rate δ and is accumulated through investment, jot . Thus, it evolves
according to (3). Employment obeys the law ofmotion (4), where not−1 and s(1−not−1)
respectively denote the share of employed and unemployed optimizing workers in the
economy at the end of period t −1. Each period employment is destroyed at the exoge-
nous rate σ and new employment opportunities come at the rate ρwt , which represents
the probability that one unemployed worker will find a job. Although the job-finding
rate ρwt is taken as given by individual workers, it is endogenously determined at the
aggregate level according to the following Cobb–Douglas matching function:7
ρwt s(1 − nt−1) = ϑt (vt , nt−1) = χ1vχ2t
[










0 in (4) represent the initial conditions for all stock vari-
ables entering the maximization problem.
The solution to the optimization programme above generates the following first
order conditions for consumption, employment, investment, capital stock, govern-
ment debt, foreign debt and money holdings:
λo1t =
1









7 Note that this specification presumes that all workers are identical to the firm.
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as well as the three households’ restrictions (2), (3) and (4).
Due to the presence of habits in consumption, Eq. (7) evaluates the current-value
shadow price of income in terms of the difference between the marginal utility of
consumption in two consecutive periods t and t + 1.
Equation (8) ensures that the intertemporal reallocation of labour supply cannot
improve the life-cycle household’s utility. This optimizing rule is a distinctive feature
of search models and substitutes for the conventional labour supply in the compet-
itive framework. It tells us that as search is a costly process there is a premium on
being employed, λo3t , which measures the marginal contribution of a newly created
job to the household’s utility. As such, λo3t includes three terms. The first term on the
right-hand side of (8) represents the difference between the value imputed to leisure
by an employed and an unemployed worker. The second term captures the present
discounted value of the cash-flow generated by the new job in t + 1, defined as the
after-tax labour incomeminus the foregone after-tax unemployment benefits. The cur-
rent-value shadow price of income, λo1t+1, evaluates this cash-flow according to its
purchasing power in terms of consumption. The third term represents the capital value
in t + 1 of an additional employed worker corrected for the probability that the new
job will be destroyed between t and t + 1.




denotes the current-value shadow price of capital. This arbi-
trage condition includes two terms. The first term represents the present discounted
value of its cash-flow in t + 1, defined as the sum of rental cost net of taxes, depre-
ciation allowances and total adjustment costs evaluated in terms of consumption. The
second term represents the present value in t + 1 of an additional unit of productive
capital corrected for the depreciation rate.
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Equation (10) states that investment is undertaken until the opportunity cost of
a marginal increase in investment in terms of consumption is equal to its marginal
expected contribution to the household’s utility.
The marginal utility of consumption evolves according to expression (11), which
is obtained by deriving the Lagrangian with respect to domestic government bonds
bot . (11) and (7) jointly yield the Euler condition for consumption.
Expression (12) is obtained by deriving the Lagrangian with respect to foreign debt
bo,emut . Note that the specification above assumes that there is no perfect arbitrage
between domestic and foreign bonds. This line is taken in Turnovsky (1985), Benigno
(2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) or Erceg et al. (2005), as a means to ensure
that net foreign assets are stationary. When taking a position in the international bonds
market, optimizing households face a financial intermediation risk premium (φbt )
which depends on net holdings of internationally traded bonds. The risk premium is
therefore modelled as follows





) − 1) (14)
The rest of the section simply rearrangesfirst order conditions to facilitate the economic
interpretation of Ricardian households’ behaviour. In order to obtain the arbitrage rela-
tion between domestic and foreign bonds we proceed to combine (12) with (11). This
algebra yields
1 + rnt = φbt (1 + rnwt ) (15)
which is the interest parity condition modified to incorporate the effect of the risk
premium. Note also that (15) differs from the standard uncovered interest parity condi-
tion in that there is no risk associated with exchange rate movements, as both domestic
and foreign bonds are expressed in the same currency.8
To obtain the arbitrage relation between physical capital and government bonds it










+ qt+1(1 − δ)
]
(16)
8 For simplicity, it is assumed that foreign bonds are expressed in euros. We could assume instead that
some bonds could be from the rest of the world, expressed in a foreign currency. In this case, the uncovered
interest rate parity for the euro area ensures that
1 + remut = Et
ert+1
ert
(1 + rwt )
where er is the nominal exchange rate. Given the relative small size of Spain in EMU, we assume that
the euro exchange rate with the rest of the world is unaffected by Spanish variables, even though Spanish
inflation has a small influence on ECB interest rates. This assumption is additionally supported by the
empirical evidence since, as documented by many authors (see, for example, Adolfson et al. 2007, and
the references there in), the unconvered interest parity condition cannot account for the forward premium
puzzle shown by the data. For these reasons, all foreign prices, including those of foreign bonds, are taken
to be exogenous and are expressed in euros.
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This is a Fisher-type condition in a context characterized by adjustment costs of instal-
lation of physical capital. In order to see this more clearly let φ = 0, implying that the
investment process is not subject to any installation costs. In this case, (10) simplifies
to qt = qt+1 = 1 and expression (16) becomes
Et
[
1 + (rt+1 − δ)
(








which is the conventional Fisher parity condition.
Finally, expression (13) can be easily rewritten as a money demand function by
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) + nrt−1φ1
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1 − η + (1 − n
r
t−1)φ2
(T − l2t )1−η
1 − η
]
subject to the law of motion of employment (4) and the specific liquidity constraint
whereby each period’s consumption expenditure must be equal to current labour
income and government transfers, as reflected in:
wt
(










1 − τ lt
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t = (1 − σ)nrt−1 + ρwt s(1 − nrt−1) (20)
nr0 (21)
where nr0 represents the initial aggregate employment rate, which is the sole stock var-
iable in the above programme. Note that RoT consumers do not save, thus they do not
hold any assets. This feature of RoT consumers considerably simplifies the solution
to the optimization programme, which is characterized by the following equations for
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λr1t =
1
(Pct /Pt )(1 + τ ct )
(
1
crt − hr crt−1
− β h
r



























Noteworthy, the optimizing behaviour of RoT households preserves the dynamic
structure of the model, due to consumption habits and the dynamic nature of the
employment decision.
2.1.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption and employment can be defined as a weighted average of the
corresponding variables for each household type:
ct =
(
1 − λr ) cot + λr crt (24)
nt =
(
1 − λr ) not + λr nrt (25)




1 − λr ) kot (26)
jt =
(
1 − λr ) jot (27)
bt =
(
1 − λr ) bot (28)
bemut =
(
1 − λr ) bo,emut (29)
mt =
(
1 − λr ) mot (30)
2.2 Factor demands
Production in the economy takes place at two different levels. At the lower level, an
infinite number of mopolistically competing firms produce differentiated intermediate
goods yi , which imperfectly substitute each other in the production of the final good.
These differentiated goods are then aggregated by competitive retailers into a final
domestic good (y) using a CES aggregator.
Intermediate producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, each firm faces
a cost minimization problem which results in optimal demands for production factors.
When choosing optimal streams of capital, energy, employment and vacancies, inter-
mediate producers set prices by varying the mark-up according to demand conditions.
Variety producer i ∈ (0, 1) uses three inputs, namely, a CES composite input of private
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capital and energy, labour and public capital. Technology possibilities are given by:
yit = zit
{[









where all variables are scaled by the trend component of total factor productivity and zt
represents a transitory technology shock. Each variety producer rents physical capital,
kt−1, and labour services, nt−1l1t , from households, and uses public capital services,
k pt−1,provided by the government. Intermediate energy inputs et can be either imported
from abroad or produced at home. The elasticity of substitution between private capital
and energy is given by 11+ρ . a ∈ (0, 1) is a distribution parameter which determines
relative factor shares in the steady state. For the sake of clarity, let us denote capital
services by kiet as:
kiet =
[




Note that if ρ = 0 expression (32) simplifies to the Cobb–Douglas case. Our specifica-
tion is more general, i.e., private capital and energy can be seen as either complements
(ρ > 0) or more substitutes than Cobb–Douglas (ρ < 0), depending on the value of
ρ. Our calibration strategy will nevertheless pin down the value of ρ so as to ensure
that the elasticity of substitution between private capital and energy is smaller than
the elasticity of substitution between the capital-energy composite and labour.
Factor demands are obtained by solving the cost minimization problem faced by
each variety producer (we drop the industry index i when no confusion arises)
min








rt kt−1 + wt
(





















γN nt = (1 − σ)nt−1 + ρ ft vt (35)
n0 (36)
where, in accordance with the ownership structure of the economy, future profits
are discounted at the household relevant rate β
λo1t+1
λo1t
. κv captures recruiting costs per
vacancy, τ sc is the social security tax rate levied on gross wages, and ρ ft is the prob-
ability that a vacancy will be filled in any given period t . It is worth noting that the
probability of filling a vacant post ρ ft is exogenously taken by the firm. However, from
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the perspective of the overall economy, this probability is endogenously determined
according to the following Cobb–Douglas matching function:
ρwt s(1 − nt−1) = ρ ft vt = χ1vχ2t
[
s (1 − nt−1) l2t
]1−χ2 (37)
Under the assumption of symmetry, the solution to the optimization programme
above generates the following first order conditions for private capital, employment,
energy and the number of vacancies

















− wt+1(1 + τ sct+1)l1t+1 + λndt+1(1 − σ)
)
(39)










(1 + τ et ) (40)
κvvt = λndt χ1vχ2t (s(1 − nt−1)l2t )1−χ2 (41)
where the real marginal cost (mct ) corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the first restriction (34), whereas λndt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the second restriction (35).
The demand for private capital is determined by (38). It is positively related to the
marginal productivity of capital (1−α) yt+1ket+1 a(
ket+1
kt
)1+ρ times the firm’s marginal cost
mct+19 which, in equilibrium, must equate the gross return on physical capital.
The intertemporal demand for labour (39) requires the marginal contribution to
profits of a new job to be equal to the marginal product net of the wage rate plus the
capital value of the new job in t + 1, corrected for the job destruction rate between t
and t + 1.
Energy demand is defined by (40). It is positively related to the marginal produc-
tivity of energy (1 − α)(1 − a) ytket−1 ( ketet )1+ρ times the marginal cost mct which, in
equilibrium, must equate the real price of energy including energy taxes.
Expression (41) reflects that firms choose the number of vacancies in such a way











is the transition probability from an unfilled to a
filled vacancy.
9 Under imperfect competition conditions, cost minimization implies that production factors are remuner-
ated by the marginal revenue times their marginal productivity. In our specification for factor demands, the
marginal revenue has been replaced by the corresponding marginal costs. We are legitimated to proceed
in this manner because in equilibrium these two marginal concepts are made equal by the imperfectly
competitive firm.
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2.3 Pricing behaviour of intermediate firms: the New Phillips curve
Since each firm yi produces a variety of domestic goodwhich is an imperfect substitute
for the varieties produced by other firms, it acts as a monopolistic competitor facing







where( PitPt ) is the relative price of variety yi , ε = (1 + ς)/ς, where ς ≥ 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods, and yt represents the produc-
























Variety producers act as monopolists and set prices when allowed. As in Calvo
hypothesis (Calvo 1983) we assume overlapping price adjustment. Each period, a
proportion θ of non-optimizing firms index prices to lagged inflation, according to
the rule Pit = (1 + πt−1) Pit−1 (with  representing the degree of indexation); a
measure 1 − θ of firms set their prices P˜i t optimally, i.e., to maximize the present
value of expected profits. Consequently, 1− θ represents the probability of adjusting
prices each period, whereas θ can be interpreted as a measure of price rigidity. Thus,






ρi t,t+ j (βθ) j
[






P˜i tπ t+ j
)−ε
Pεt+ j yt+ j (45)
where P˜i t is the price set by the optimizing firm at time t, β is the discount factor,
mct,t+ j represents the marginal cost at t + j of the firm that last set its price in period
t , π t+ j = ∏ jh=1 (1 + πt+h−1) . ρt,t+ j , a price kernel which captures the marginal






1t+ j/Pt+ j )
Et (λo1t+ j−1/Pt+ j−1)
(46)
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The first order condition of the optimization problem above is


























As standard in the literature,10 Eq. (48) can be used to obtain an expression for
aggregate inflation of the form:
πt = β
1 + β Etπt+1 +
(1 − βθ) (1 − θ)
θ(1 + β) m̂ct +

1 + β πt−1 (49)
where m̂ct in mct = ε−1ε (1+ m̂ct ) measures the deviation of the firm’s marginal cost
from the steady state. Equation (49) is known in the literature as the New Phillips
Curve. It participates of the conventional Phillips-curve philosophy that inflation is
influenced by activity in the short run. However, the New Phillips Curve emphasizes
realmarginal costs as the relevant variable to the inflation process, which is in turn seen
as a forward-looking phenomenon. This is so because when opportunities to adjust
prices arrive infrequently, a firm will be concerned with future inflation. A second
departure of the New Phillips curve from the traditional one is that it is derived from
the optimizing behaviour of firms. This makes it possible to define the marginal cost
elasticity of inflation, λ, as a function of the structural parameters in the model, β
and θ :
λ = (1 − βθ) (1 − θ)
θ(1 + β) (50)
Equation (50) shows that an increase in the average time spell between price
changes, θ , makes current inflation less responsive to m̂ct . Output movements will
therefore have a smaller impact on current inflation, holding expected future inflation
constant. The reduced form of the New Phillips curve can be written as:
πt = β f Etπt+1 + λm̂ct + βbπt−1 (51)
Notice that, for the sake of simplicity, the model neglects the influence of the distri-
bution of prices (implicit in the Calvo hypothesis) in equilibrium. However, as shown
by Burriel et al. (2007) in a DGE setting with nominal rigidities, such simplifying
assumption affects the explanatory power of the model neither dynamically nor in the
steady state.
10 See, for instance, Galí et al. (2001).
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2.4 Trade in the labour market: the labour contract
The key departure of search models from the competitive paradigm is that trading in
the labour market is subject to transaction costs. Each period, the unemployed engage
in search activities in order to find vacant posts spread over the economy. Costly
search in the labour market implies that there are simultaneous flows into and out
of the state of employment, thus an increase (reduction) in the stock of unemploy-
ment takes place whenever job destruction (creation) predominates over job creation




t vt = ρwt s(1 − nt−1) = χ1vχ2t
[
(1 − nt−1) l2t
]1−χ2 = (1 − σ)nt−1 (52)
Because it takes time (for households) and real resources (for firms) to make profit-
able contacts, some pure economic rent emerges with each new job, which is equal
to the sum of the expected search costs the firm and the worker will further incur if
they refuse to match. The presence of such rents gives rise to a bilateral monopoly
framework, whereby both parties cooperate for a win-win job match, but compete for
the share of the overall surplus.
Several wage and hours determination schemes can be applied to a bilateral monop-
oly framework. In particular, we will assume that firms and workers negotiate a labour
contract in hours and wages in an efficient-bargaining manner. As discussed by Pis-
sarides (2000, ch. 7, p. 176), hours of work may be determined either by the worker
in such a way as to maximize his utility or by a bargain between the firm and the
worker. The efficient number of hours is nevertheless determined by a Nash bargain.
If workers choose their own hours of work, they will choose to work too few hours.
The reason of this inefficiency is related to the existence of search costs.11
Note that, because homogeneity holds across all job-worker pairs in the economy,
the outcome of this negotiation will be the same everywhere. However an individual
firm and worker are too small to influence the market. As a result when they meet they
negotiate the terms of the contract by taking as given the behaviour in the rest of the
market. The outcome of the bargaining process maximizes the weighted individual















where λw ∈ (0, 1) reflects the worker’s bargaining power. The two terms in brackets







tively denote the earning premium of employment over unemployment for a Ricardian
and a RoT worker. Similarly, λndt represents the profit premium of a filled over an
unfilled vacancy for the representative firm. Note that this bargaining scheme features
the same wage for all workers, irrespective of whether they are Ricardian or RoT .
11 See also Trigari (2004) for further details about the implications of using alternatively the so called
right-to-manage hypothesis.
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Efficient real wage and hours worked (53) satisfy the following conditions:
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where we see that the equilibrium wage in a search framework is a weighted average
between the highest feasible wage (i.e., the marginal productivity of labour augmented
by the expected hiring cost per unemployed worker) and the lowest acceptable wage
(i.e., the reservation wage, as given by the second and third terms in the right-hand
side of (54)).Weights are given by the parties’ bargaining power in the negotiation, λw
and (1 − λw). Notice that when λr = 0, all consumers are Ricardian, and, therefore,
the solutions for the wage rate and hours simplify to the standard ones (see Andolfatto
1996).
Putting aside for the moment the last term in the right-hand side of (54), the outside
option (i.e., the reservation wage) is given, first, by the gap between the value imputed
to leisure by anunemployed andby an employedworker. This gap is, in turn, aweighted
average of the valuation of leisure by Ricardian and RoT workers, that differ in their
marginal utilities of consumption (λo1t and λ
r
1t ). Notice that the higher the marginal
utility of consumption is, the higher the willingness of workers to accept relatively
lower wages. Second, the reservation wage also depends on unemployment benefits
(gut ). An increase in the replacement rate improves the worker’s threat point in the
bargain process and exercites upward pressure to the bargained wage.
The third term in the right-hand side of (54) is a part of the reservation wage that
depends only on the existence of RoT workers (only if λr > 0 this term is different
from zero). It can be interpreted as an inequality term in utility. The economic intuition
is as follows: RoT consumers are not allowed to use their wealth to smooth consump-
tion over time, but they can take advantage of the fact that a matching today continues
with some probability (1−σ) in the future, yielding a labour income that, in turn, will
be used to consume tomorrow. Therefore, they use the margin that hours and wage
negotiation provides them to improve their lifetime utility, by narrowing the gap in util-
ity with respect to Ricardian consumers. In this sense, they compare the intertemporal




expected rate given their present rationing situation (
λr1t+1
λr1t







the whole third term in (54) is positive, indicating that RoT
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individuals put additional pressure on the average reservation wage, as a way to ease
their period by period constraint on consumption. The importance of this inequality




because it increases the value of a matching to continue in the future, and negatively
related to the job finding probability (ρwt ), that reduces the loss of breaking up the
match.
Finally, fiscal variables also influence the division of the surplus rather than the
definition of the worker’s and the firm’s threat points in the bargain. As commented
earlier, the replacement rate increases the bargained wage because it raises income
from unemployment. Both consumption and labour marginal taxes influence equilib-
rium wages because the imputed value of leisure is not taxed. An increase in either τ ct
or τ l make leisure more attractive in relation to work and, by doing so, increase wages
in equilibrium. By contrast, an increase in social security contributions reduces wages
by making recruiting an additional worker more expensive.
2.5 Government
Each period the government decides the size and composition of public expenditure
and the mix of taxes and new debt holdings required to finance total expenditure. It
is assumed that government purchases of goods and services (gct ) and public invest-
ment (git ) follow an exogenously given pattern, while interest payments on govern-
ment bonds (1 + rt )bt−1 are model-determined, as well as unemployment benefits
gut s(1 − nt−1) and government social transfers gst which are given by
gut = rrwt (56)
gst = trgdpt (57)
whereby gut and gst are indexed to the level of real wages, wt , and activity, gdpt ,
through rr and tr .
Government revenues are made up of direct taxation on labour income (personal
labour income tax, τ lt , and social security contributions, τ
sc
t ) and capital income (τ
k
t ),
as well as indirect taxation, including a consumption tax at the rate τ ct , and an energy
tax at the rate τ et . Government revenues are therefore given by




ct + τ et
Pet
Pt
et + trht + τ lt rrwt s(1 − nt−1)l2t + τ lt gst (58)
where trht stands for lump-sum transfers as defined further below.
Government revenues and expenditures each period are made consistent by means
of the intertemporal budget constraint
γAγN bt = gct + git + gut s(1 − nt−1)l2t + gst − tt +
(1 + rnt )
1 + πt bt−1 (59)
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Equation (59) reflects that the gap between overall receipts and outlays is financed by
variations in lump-sum transfers to households, trht (which enter the fiscal budget
rule through the term tt ), and/or debt issuance. Note that government cannot raise
income from seniorage.
Dynamic sustainability of public debt requires the introduction of a debt rule that
makes one or several fiscal categories an instrument for debt stabilization. In order to
enforce the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, the following fiscal policy
reaction function is imposed

















where ψ1 > 0 captures the speed of adjustment from the current ratio towards the
desired target ( bgdp ). The value of ψ2 > 0 is chosen to ensure a smooth adjustment of
current debt towards its steady-state level. Note that while in the baseline specification
debt stabilization is achieved through variations in lump-sum transfers, other receipt
and spending categories could also play this role.
Government investment (exogenous in the model) augments public capital, which,
given the depreciation δ p, follows the law of motion:
γAγN k
p
t = git + (1 − δ p)k pt−1 (61)
2.6 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is managed by the ECB via the following Taylor rule, which allows
for some smoothness of the interest rate response to the inflation and output gap
ln
1 + remut
1 + remu =ρ
r ln
1 + remut−1
1 + remu +ρ
π(1 − ρr ) ln 1 + π
emu
t
1 + πemu +ρ
y(1 − ρr ) ln ln yemut
(62)
where all the variables with the superscript “emu” refer to EMU aggregates Thus,
remut and π
emu
t are the euro-zone (nominal) short-term interest rate and inflation as
measured in terms of the consumption price deflator and  ln yemut measures the rel-
ative deviation of GDP growth from its trend. There is also some inertia in nominal
interest rate setting. As discussed by Woodford (2003), (62) is the optimal outcome
of a rational central bank facing an objective function, with output and inflation as
arguments, in a general equilibrium setting.
The Spanish economy contributes to EMU inflation according to its economic size
in the euro zone, ωSp:
πemut = (1 − ωSp)πremut + ωSpπt (63)
where πremut is average inflation in the rest of the Eurozone.
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The disappearance of national currencies since the inception of the monetary union
means that the intra-euro-area real exchange rate is given by the ratio of relative prices
between the domestic economy and the remaining EMU members, so real apprecia-
tion/depreciation developments are driven by the inflation differential of the Spanish
economy vis-à-vis the euro area:
rert+1
rert
= 1 + π
emu
t+1
1 + πt+1 (64)
2.7 The external sector
The small open economy assumption implies that world prices and world demand
are given from the perspective of the national economy. It also means that feedback
linkages between the Spanish economy, EMU and the rest of the world are ignored.
Another simplifying assumption concerns the nature of final and intermediate goods
produced at home, which are all regarded as tradable.
2.7.1 The allocation of consumption and investment between domestic and foreign
produced goods
Aggregate consumption and investment are CES composite baskets of home and for-
eign produced goods. Consumption and investment distributors determine the share of
aggregate consumption (investment) to be satisfied with home produced goods ch and
ih , and foreign imported goods c f and i f . The aggregation technology is expressed
by the following CES functions:
ct =
(


































whereσc andσi are the consumption and investment elasticities of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods.
Each period, the representative consumption distributor chooses cht and c f t so as
to minimize production costs subject to the technological constraint given by (65).
The Lagrangian of this problem can be written as:
min
cht ,c f t
{
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where Pt and Pmt are respectively the prices of home and foreign produced goods.
Note that Pct represents both the price of the consumption good for households and
the shadow cost of production faced by the aggregator.
The optimal allocation of aggregate consumption between domestic and foreign
goods, cht and c f t , satisfies the following conditions:












Proceeding in the same manner as with the investment distributor problem, similar
expressions can be obtained regarding the optimal allocation of aggregate investment
between domestic and foreign goods, iht and i f t













The price of domestically produced consumption and investment goods is the GDP
deflator, Pt . In order to obtain the consumption price deflator, the demands for home
and foreign consumption goods (68) and (69) need to be incorporated into the cost of
producing one unit of aggregate consumption goods (Pt cht + Pmt c f t ). Bearing inmind
that the unitary production cost is equal to the price of production, one can express









(1 − ωi t )P1−σit + ωi t Pm1−σit
) 1
1−σi (73)
The exogenous world price is a weighted average of the final and intermediate goods
prices, PFM and P
e
, both expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Given the
small open economy assumption, the relevant foreign price is defined as:
Pmt =
(
α˜e Pet + (1 − α˜e)PFMt
)
(74)
where α˜e stands for the ratio of energy imports to overall imports.
We assume that export prices set by Spanish firms deviate from competitors’ prices
in foreign markets, at least temporarily. This is known in the literature as the “pricing-
to-market hypothesis” and it is consistent with a model of monopolistic competition
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among firms where each firm regards its influence on other firms as negligible. To
make this assumption operational, we consider a fraction of (1 − ptm) firms whose
prices at home and abroad differ. The remaining ptm goods can be freely traded by
consumers so firms set a unified price across countries (i.e., the law of one price holds).






where Pxt is the export price deflator,PFMt is the competitors’ price index expressed in
euros and the parameter ptm determines the extent towhich there is pricing-to-market.
2.7.3 Exports and imports
The national economy imports two final goods, consumption and investment, and one
intermediate commodity, energy:
imt = c f t + i f t + αeet (76)
where αe represents the ratio of energy imports over total energy consumption.
Exports are a function of aggregate consumption and investment abroad, ywt , and








where σx is the long-run price elasticity of exports. Plugging (75) into (77) yields the




















Conversely, if the law of one price holds for all consumption and investment goods,
then ptm = 1, Pxt = Pmt = PFMt and expression (77) simplifies to
ext = sxt ywt (80)
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Thus if the law of one price holds, exports are a sole function of total aggregate
consumption and investment from abroad. Under full pricing to market (ptm = 0),
exports are also a function of relative prices with elasticity σx . Under the more general
case of partial pricing-to-market (0 < ptm < 1), the price elasticity of exports is
given (1 − ptm)σx .
2.7.4 Stock-flow interaction between the current account balance
and the accumulation of foreign assets
In the model, the current account balance is defined as the trade balance plus net factor














Following standard practice in the literature (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff
1995, 1996), net foreign assets are regarded as a stock variable resulting from the

















Equation (82) is obtained by combining the Ricardian households’ budget constraint
(assuming a zero net supply for domestic bonds and money), the government’s budget
constraint and the economy’s aggregate resource constraint.
2.8 Accounting identities in the economy
Gross output can be defined as the sum of (final) demand components and the (inter-
mediate) consumption of energy:
yt = cht + iht + git + gct +
Pxt
Pt




(1 − αe)et + κ f (83)
where, in line with definitions above (68) and (70), cht and iht are equal to over-
all domestic consumption and investment minus consumption and investment goods
imported from abroad, and κ f is an entry cost which ensures that extraordinary profits
vanish in imperfectly competitive equilibrium in the long-run. Value added generated
in the economy is given by:




et − κ f − κvvt (84)
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3 Model solution method and parameterization
3.1 Model solution method
The number of equations involved in the model and the presence of non-linearities do
not allow for a closed-form solution for the dynamic stable path. In order to provide
a solution for dynamic systems of this nature it has become a common procedure in
the literature to use a numerical method. There are several ways of solving forward-
looking models with rational expectations. Most of them rely on algorithms that are
applied to the linearized version of the system around the steady state. This approach,
which is very popular in the literature, was first introduced by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
In order to solve the model we follow the method developed by Laffarque (1990),
Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard (1996). As various endogenous variables in the model
have leads, representing expectations of these variables in future time periods, an
assumption has to be made regarding the formation of expectations. In REMS expec-
tations are rational and, therefore, model-consistent. This means that each period’s
future expectations coincide with the model’s solution for the future. In simulations
this implies that the leads in the model equations are equal to the solution values
for future periods. This rational expectations solution is implemented by applying a
stacked-time algorithm that solves for multiple time periods simultaneously, i.e., it
stacks the time periods into one large system of equations and solves them simulta-
neously using Newton–Raphson iterations. The method is robust because the number
of iterations is scarcely affected by convergence criteria, the number of time periods
or the size of the shock. The model is simulated using the Dynare software system.
REMS obeys the necessary local condition for the uniqueness of a stable equilib-
rium in the neighbourhood of the steady state, i.e., there are asmany eigenvalues larger
than one in modulus as there are forward-looking variables in the system.
3.2 The database REMSDB
The database REMSDB includes the main Spanish economic aggregates (see Boscá
et al. 2007, for further details). The complete set of series covers the period 1980–2010,
which in turn can be divided into two sub-periods depending on the nature of the data.
The first one ranges from 1980 to the last available data released by the various statis-
tical sources, i.e., 2007 in the current version of the database. The second one, which
spans over a 5-year period, relies on the official forecasts reflected in the Stability and
Growth Programme (SGP). In the existing version of REMSDB the last available year
of the forecast period corresponds to 2010. Finally, in order to generate a baseline
scenario for the REMS model, the whole set of variables are extended forward until
2050. Such data extrapolation complies with the balanced-growth hypothesis of the
model.
All series are quarterly data. In most cases, data on a quarterly basis were readily
available from the existing statistical sources. Annual series were transformed into
quarterly by applying the Kalman filter and smoother to an appropriate state-space
123
158 SERIEs (2010) 1:135–169
model in which observations correspond to low-frequency data. Monthly series were
converted into quarterly data with techniques that are specific to each series. All series
take the form of seasonally adjusted data.Whenever the series provided by official sta-
tistical sources were not so, they were seasonally adjusted through TRAMO-SEATS
procedures.
The data compiled in REMSDB has generally not been subject to any transforma-
tion other than the extraction of the seasonal component or the mere application of
linking-back techniques. The group of variables used to construct the baseline scenario
have nevertheless been expressed in efficiency units in order to ensure the stationary
property.
The database considers five types of variables. While each of these groups is some-
what stylized, they gather a set of variables of a different nature. The first category
includes production and demand aggregates and their deflators. A second group brings
together population and labour-market series. The third block is made up of mone-
tary and financial variables, whereas the fourth one includes aggregates of the general
government. A final group gathers a number of heterogeneous variables used in the
baseline scenario and for which no direct statistical counterpart is available from offi-
cial sources.
3.3 Model parameterization
Model parameters have been fixed using a hybrid approach of calibration and estima-
tion. Some parameter values are taken from QUEST II and other related DGEmodels.
Several other parameters are obtained from steady-state conditions. The remaining
parameters have been estimated on the basis of selected model’s equations. Alto-
gether, these parameters produce a baseline solution that accurately resembles the
behaviour of the Spanish economy over the last two decades.
The data used for calibration purposes come from the REMSDB database and cover
the period 1985:3 2006:4, during which the behaviour of endogenous variables com-
plies with cyclical empirical regularities (see Puch and Licandro 1997; Boscá et al.
2007). The group of variables without statistical counterpart in official sources include
consumption and employment of RoT and optimizing consumers, the Lagrangemulti-
pliers, theTobin’sq, the composite of private physical capital and energy,marginal cost
and total factor productivity. These variables are computed using their corresponding
behavioural equations in the model.
Table 1 lists the values of parameters and exogenous variables. The implied steady
state values of the endogenous variables are given in Table 2.12 Broadly speaking, the
calibration strategy follows a sequence by which we start by setting the value of a
number of parameters which are subsequently used to obtain a measure of the level of
total factor productivity. This makes it possible to express all variables in the model
in terms of efficiency units. The remaining parameters are then fixed on the basis of
the model’s equations with variables measured in efficiency units.
12 The model has been programmed in relative prices. This means that nominal variables are normalized
with, Pt , the price deflator of domestic final goods.
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Table 1 Parameter values
θ 0.5400 γ 1.75 κ f 0.129148 ρ
w 0.75






2.40 yw 7.306437 ρe 0.85
δ 0.01587 rr 0.20225 T 1.369 s 0.269341
δ p 0.01058 τ l 0.110766 χm 0.20347 φb 0.006
κv 0.18414 τ k 0.208272 sx 0.021345 ptm 0.57675
σ 0.08625 τ c 0.106985 ωc 0.1395 λw 0.42743
χ1 0.61158 τ sc 0.221531 ωi 0.423765 mc 0.840691
χ2 0.57257 τ e 0.20 λr 0.5 σc 1.20548
l2 0.21828 ψ1 0.01 ho 0.6 σx 1.3
φ1 3.23775 ψ2 0.2 hr 0.0 σi 0.93043
φ2 2.59905 η 2.0 αe 0.498 λ 0.2006
ρ 0.99776 γA 1.00170 α˜e 0.10489 β
f 0.4965
a 0.99888 γN 1.00325 tr 0.138154 β
b 0.5035
φ 5.50 rnw 0.0142 trh 0.0259859 ωSp 0.1000
Table 2 Steady state
bt 1.4207 iht 0.0787 λ
r
3t 1.5633 gst 0.0818
bot 1.4207 imt 0.1542 λ
nd
t 0.5119 trht 0.0326
ct 0.3618 jt 0.1408 λo1t 2.2221 tt 0.2104











cot 0.4251 kt 6.7604 πt 0.0000 wt 1.5147
crt 0.2985 ket 5.7032 gdpt 0.5920 w˜t 1.5147
et 0.0402 kot 13.521 π
c
t 0.0000 yt 0.7764
















t 6.5072 qt 1.0164






it 0.1489 nrt 0.4499 φbt 1.0000
i f t 0.0709 λ
o
3t 0.1560 l2t 0.2183
The Cobb–Douglas parameter α matches the average value of the labour share in
the data, as measured by the ratio of compensation of employees to GDP. The public
capital elasticity of output, ζ , has been set at 0.06, which falls within the range of
the estimated values reported by Gramlich (1994). Given the values of α and ζ it is
straightforward to obtain the level of technological efficiency, At , using expression
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(31). HP-filtered total factor productivity is then used to rescale all variables with
respect to efficiency. Technical progress, γA, is given by the growth rate of trend
productivity.
The calibrated values of a number of parameters are taken from QUEST II. This
is the case of the subjective discount rate, β, the parameter of adjustment costs in
the investment function, φ, the long-run price elasticity of exports, σx , and fiscal rule
parameters, ψ1 and ψ2.
Following Andolfatto (1996), we choose a value of 2 for parameter defining the
degree of intertemporal labour substitution, η, whereas the amount of time devoted to
looking for a job, l2, is estimated as half as much the quarterly average of working
time. κv is calibrated to match an overall cost of vacant posts equal to 0.5% points of
GDP. As in Burnside et al. (1993) we fix total productive time endowment T at 1.369
(thousand) hours per quarter. The exogenous job destruction rate, σ , is calibrated from
the law of motion of the employment (4). The share of non-employed workers actively
searching for a job, s, is obtained from the ratio between the unemployment rate and
one minus the employment rate, (1 − n).
We follow Doménech et al. (2002) in calibrating the parameters that enter the mon-
etary policy reaction function γE MU and ρrEMU. The weight of the Spanish economy
in the euro-zone inflation, ωSp, is set at 10%. The public debt to GDP target ratio
has been set at 2.4. This corresponds to a 60% value on an annual basis, which is
equal to the limit established in the Stability and Growth Pact. Tax rates on labour and
capital income and consumption expenditure (τ l , τ k , τ sc, τ c) have been constructed
following the methodology developed by Boscá et al. (2005). Tax rate on energy, τ et ,
has been set at 0.20. The growth rate of population, γN , has been computed on the
basis of working-age population data. We use the ratio of unemployment benefits to
labour compensation to calibrate the replacement rate, rr .
The value of 0.6 for ho, the parameter that captures habits in consumption of Ri-
cardian households, has been taken from Smets and Wouters (2003). The fraction of
RoT consumers in the Spanish economy, λr , is assumed to be 0.5 which is a quite
standard value. The risk premium parameter, φb, is fixed at 0.006. This is somewhat
higher than the value in Erceg et al. (2005), implying faster convergence of the foreign
asset position to the steady state. The scale parameter of the matching function, χ1,
and the elasticity of matchings with respect to vacant posts, χ2, have been estimated
at, respectively, 0.61 and 0.57, respectively. In line with the efficiency condition in
Hosios (1990), the workers’ bargaining power is set at 1 − χ2.
The entry cost, κ f , is calculated at 0.13 from a markup of 20%. Using data on
the weight of intermediate inputs in gross output from the Input-Output tables, the
distributional parameter in the energy-capital composite, a, has been set to 0.99.The
estimated value ofρ is 0.99,which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution 1/(1+ρ)
of 0.50, implying that private capital and energy are complements in production. Value
added is then computed using the accounting identity (84). The ratio of energy imports
to total energy consumption, αe, is taken from the Input-Output Tables (year 2000).
Private and public capital depreciation δ and δ p are the rates implicit in the capital
series in BDREMS, respectively around 6 and 4% per year.
As regards preference parameters in the households utility function, φ1 and φ2,
the former is estimated from the hours schedule Eq. (55), whereas the latter has been
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computed as a weighted average (with weights λr and (1− λr )) of the estimates aris-
ing from the two labour supply conditions, (8) and (23). Overall, our values for φ1
and φ2 resemble those obtained by Andolfatto (1996) and other related research in
the literature, implying that the imputed value for leisure by an employed worker is
situated well above the imputed value for leisure by an unemployed worker.
We use the employment demand (39) to obtain a series for the firm’s marginal cost,
mct . The steady state value, mc, is set at the sample mean. We choose the degree of
price indexation  at 1 (hypothesis testing of an estimated value of 1 for  results
in no rejection), and use expression (49) to obtain a GMM estimation of the fraction
of non-optimizing firms, θ . The estimated value is equal to 0.54. Together with the
subjective discount rate, these two parameters imply a value of 0.20 for the marginal
cost elasticity of inflation, λ,13 and 0.50 for the weights attached to the forward and
backward components of inflation, β f and βb. Values of these parameters about one
half are a key feature of the hybrid Phillips curve with full indexation, as evidenced
by the empirical literature.14
In the external sector, we have used Eqs. (75) and (74) to obtain estimations of the
pricing-to-market parameter, ptm, and the ratio of energy imports to overall imports,
α˜e. Our estimate for α˜e suggests that energy represents around 10% of total imports.
The estimated value of ptm parameter (0.58) is of the same order of magnitude as in
QUEST II (0.61). The weight of domestic consumption goods in the CES aggrega-
tor, ωc, and the consumption elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods, σc, are estimated simultaneously using conditions (68) and (69). Similarly, for
the case of investment goods, ωi and σi are estimated simultaneously using Eqs. (70)
and (71). The estimated elasticities suggest a slightly higher elasticity of substitu-
tion between domestic and foreign goods for consumption goods as compared with
investment goods. We use the export equation (77) to calibrate the scale parameter sx .
The energy price index, Pe, and the world price index, PFM, match sample averages
calculated over the calibration period.
The value of two parameters has been accommodated to ensure the desirable long-
run properties of the model. The world interest rate, remu , is set to satisfy the static
version of Eq. (11), so that the current account is balanced in the steady state. Second,
foreign output, yw, is adjusted to obtain a steady state value of the real exchange rate
close to the observed one.
Finally, the value of a number of parameters has been chosen for labour market
variables to display plausible dynamic patterns. Namely, we assume partial inertia in
the search effort, ρe. As in Blanchard and Galí (2006), we allow for slow adjustment in




t , with w˜t being
the Nash-bargained wage. This hypothesis is introduced in the model in an ad hoc
manner, with an estimated value of ρw = 0.75.
13 This value is significantly higher than that obtained by Galí and Lopez-Salido (2001).
14 Bils and Klenow (2004) find that the average duration between price adjustments is over six months.
The evidence on price setting in the euro area at the individual level by Álvarez et al. (2006) shows that
prices in the euro area are stickier than in the US.
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Fig. 1 Effects of a transitory technological shock
4 Simulations
This section shows the properties of the model and examines the basic transmission
channels at work by presenting some simulation exercises. First, we show results of
two standard simulated scenarios, a technology shock and a public consumption shock.
The two shocks are of a temporary nature and fully anticipated by economic agents.
Finally, we end this section with the simulated short and long-run impacts on some
macroeconomic variables of a menu of fiscal policies.
4.1 A transitory technology shock
In this section an exogenous productivity improvement is implemented as a 1%
increase of zi . The technology shock ismodelled as a first-order autoregressive process
with a persistence parameter of 0.9, implying that the level of total factor productivity
after 5years is situated 0.2% points above the steady state level.
Figure 1 displays the (quarterly) dynamic responses of selected macroeconomic
variables in the model. Simulation results are percentage deviations from baseline,
except for the trade surplus and the GDP deflator inflation, which are absolute devia-
tions.
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Fig. 2 Effects of a technology
shock on full-time equivalent
employment










Figure 1 shows that the multiplier on GDP on impact is close to one third. The GDP
effect is quite persistent, reaching a peak after four quarters. There are also positive
and long-lasting effects on consumption, investment and wages. Slow adjustment in
Nash-bargained wages is reflected in a positive albeit muted effect on wages, which
generates a marked response in employment. The shock also leads to an increase in
consumption, which peaks after five quarters. Hump-shaped consumption dynamics is
explained by the presence of RoT households, which display relatively more volatile
and less persistent consumption compared with Ricardians. It is worth mentioning
that our impulse-response functions closely resemble those presented in Andrés et al.
(2008) who, extending the research of Andrés and Doménech (2006), also find small
effects in the very short run following a technology shock in the context of a model
with price rigidities and RoT consumers.
As expected, the technology shock has a sizable effect onmarginal costs (not shown
in the graph),which fall on impact, thereby increasing the Tobin’s q and stimulating
capital accumulation through investment. Also, the fall in marginal costs moderates
inflation, improves price competitiveness and encourages export demand. However,
the booming in domestic absorption accelerates imports and more than offsets the
positive effect of the real depreciation on the trade balance in the short run.
The effect on vacancies is quite pronounced. To give an order of magnitude, note
that the response of vacancies on impact is more than 10 times as large as that of
GDP. This result is explained by the positive impact that enhanced GDP growth has
on search effort. Moreover, our model can account for the evidence documented by
Fujita (2004) and Ravn and Simonelli (2007), whereby vacancies display a hump-
shaped pattern and peak around 3 quarters after the shock. In our model, following the
initial positive response, vacancies register an increase to afterwards decline as labour
market becomes tighter. Although short-lived, the increase in vacancies encourages
job creation and employment, whose effects are more persistent as explained further
below.
Thebehaviour of (full-time-equivalent) employment is plotted inFig. 2.Thedynam-
ics of this variable is in sharp contrastwith the pattern implied by a standardRBCmodel
with flexible prices. In presence of price rigidities, responses in both the intensive and
the extensive margins of labour differ in direction and size.While the employment rate
123
164 SERIEs (2010) 1:135–169































































Fig. 3 Effects of a transitory public consumption shock
rises over time, hours per worker sharply falls on impact. Overall, (full-time equiva-
lent) employment falls over the first four quarters, and only attains pre-shock levels
after 1year. These predictions match the empirical findings of a growing literature
beginning with Galí (1999) (see, for instance, Section 2 in Galí and Rabanal 2004 and
Andrés et al. 2008, for an overview of research studies with similar conclusions).
4.2 A transitory public consumption shock
With a view to illustrate further transmission channels in REMS, this section discusses
an exogenous transitory shock affecting the steady-state level of public consumption.
The fiscal impulse amounts to 1% of baseline GDP (or 6.5% of gc) and it is assumed
to follow a first-order autoregressive process with a persistence parameter of 0.9.
Figure 3 displays the quarterly dynamic responses of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables in the model.
The multiplier on GDP (GDP/gc) on impact is equal to 1. A transitory impulse
to public consumption leads to a significant increase in consumption (by around 0.5%
points on impact), that lasts for about two quarters. This is confirmed by existing evi-
dence of models allowing for liquidity-constrained (see Blanchard andGalí 2006; Galí
et al. 2007). As suggested by the second panel in Fig. 3, the dynamics of overall con-
sumption is largely driven by the behaviour of RoT households, whose consumption
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Fig. 4 Effects of a public
consumption shock on full-time
equivalent employment










increases on impact by more than 1% point. In contrast, optimizing households, which
are fully aware of the transitory nature of the shock, revise their current consumption
downwards to offset the negative effect of the fiscal stimulus on government savings.
Private investment falls immediately after the shock and continues dropping up to
1.5% after three to four quarters, suggesting a sizable crowding-out effect. The trough
in investment can be rationalized in terms of a decline in Tobin’s q, a slightly higher
euro-zone nominal interest rate (as higher inflation and output gaps in the Spanish
economy affect the corresponding euro-zone variables in a proportion determined by
the weight of the domestic economy in the euro area), and a higher risk premium. The
latter results in a lower level of external debt hold by domestic households.
Figure 3 shows that employment, hours, real wages and vacancies increase on
impact, then gradually return to normal. The jump in vacant posts is explained by
improved search effort and a higher shadow price of employment, λnd . Full-time
equivalent employment (see Fig. 4) is enhanced by the positive response of employ-
ment both in terms of headcounts and hours worked.
4.3 Choosing among different fiscal policies
We use now REMS to simulate the short (Table 3) and long run effects (Table 4) of
performing different fiscal policy measures. In all cases we show the impact on GDP,
employment and the ratio of public debt to GDP. Thus, we analyse the effects of a 1%
point reduction in the effective labour tax rate (row 1), of a 1% point reduction in the
effective consumption tax rate (row 2), of a 1% GDP increase in public consumption
(row 3) and of a 1% GDP increase in public investment (row 4). Finally, in row 5 we
take into account the proposal of Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2009)
simulating the effects of a 2% point reduction in the labour tax rate, together with a
1% point increase in the consumption tax rate. According to their results a 1% point
reduction in the effective labour tax rate in Spain would increase GDP on impact by
1.076%, whereas a 1% point reduction in the effective consumption tax rate would
cause a rise in GDP of 0.175%. Both measures taken together, which constitute their
preferred policy-mix, would increase GDP by about 2% on impact. Surprisingly their
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Table 3 Fiscal policies (1year multiplier)
Economic policy measure GDP Employment Public debt/GDP
(1) Labour tax reduction (1%) 0.353 0.620 0.285
(2) Consumption tax reduction (1%) 0.285 0.501 0.269
(3) Public consumption increase (1% of GDP) 0.336 0.621 0.137
(4) Public investment increase (1% of GDP) 0.677 0.927 −0.077
(5) Fernández-Villaverde & Rubio proposal 0.421 0.737 0.302
Table 4 Fiscal policies (long run multiplier)
Measure GDP Employment Public debt/GDP
(1) Labour tax reduction (1%) 0.54 0.59 0
(2) Consumption tax reduction (1%) 0.44 0.48 0
(3) Public consumption increase (1% of GDP) 0.94 0.85 0
(4) Public investment increase (1% of GDP) 3.28 0.23 0
(5) Fernández-Villaverde & Rubio proposal 0.64 0.69 0
results show that increasing public investment 1% point would reduce GDP on impact
a 1.124%.
Our results are in contrast with those of Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez
(2009). Looking at the 1year multipliers in Table 3 (calculated as a simple aver-
age of simulated effects in the first four quarters), we find that public investment
would generate the biggest effect both on GDP, that would increase a 0.677%, and
on employment, that would rise by almost 1% point. The Fernández-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramírez (2009) proposal is the second preferred option in the ranking of simu-
lations performed with REMS, although with lower impact that the one calculated by
these authors. Moreover, the cost of this proposal in terms of public debt is the highest
one among all fiscal policy actions considered. In the long run, when the public debt
to GDP ratio returns to its initial value, the primacy of public investment policies
with respect to other ways of implementing fiscal policies is even more pronounced.
Thus, our simulations give support to the recent government injection of 8,000 million
euros to finance public investment (Plan E), when comparing its effects on GDP and
employment with other fiscal measures based on transfers to households or tax cuts.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a Rational Expectations Model for Simulation and Policy Eval-
uation of the Spanish Economy (REMS). REMS is a DGE model for a small open
economy. It is primarily constructed to serve as a tool for simulation and policy eval-
uation of alternative scenarios. This means that REMS is not used for forecasting, but
rather to analyse how the effects of policy shocks are transmitted over the medium
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term. It also means that the emphasis of the model is on the transmission channels
through which policy action affects the domestic economy.
As far as economic theory is concerned, REMS can be characterized as a New
Keynesian model with the optimizing behaviour of households and firms being deeply
rooted in the Rational Expectations hypothesis. The supply side of the economy is
modelled through a neoclassical production function, implying that the long-term
behaviour of the model closely reproduces the Solow growth model, that is, the econ-
omy reaches a steady state path with a growth rate determined by the rate of exogenous
technical progress plus the growth rate of the population. However, some prominent
features differentiate this model from the neoclassical paradigm in the long term.
First, trading both in the goods and the labour market is not achieved under Walrasian
conditions. Firms in goods markets operate under monopolistic competition, setting
prices in a sluggish manner. In the labour market, firms and workers negotiate how
to distribute the rents generated in the matching process. Consequently, in our model
equilibrium unemployment will persist in the long term. Second, a share of households
behaves as myopic consumers that do not optimize intertemporally. Additionally, con-
sumers take into account past consumption (habits) in their decisions. As a result, the
behaviour of aggregate consumption after a fiscal shock departs considerably from
what could be expected in a neoclassical setting. In the short term REMS is also influ-
enced by the New Keynesian literature allowing for a stabilizing role of demand-side
policies.
Nevertheless, the model still lacks sufficient detail to make a direct link between
some specific reform efforts and economic performance. Several ways of improving
the model are opened for the future. For instance, a weak point of the existing ver-
sion of the model is that it is not detailed enough to differentiate across skill groups
of the labour force. Also, REMS sticks on the exogenous nature of technical pro-
gress, whereas it is widely recognized by now that knowledge investment is a key
to economic growth and there is a link between the growth rate of technical pro-
gress and R&D spending. Moreover, as the recent financial crisis has made it clear
a better understanding is needed of the linkages between the financial sector and
the real sector. A final improvement of the model concerns estimation techniques.
Forthcoming versions of REMS should estimate the model using Bayesian estimation
techniques.
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